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Chapter 13
Securitized Risk Instruments as Alternative
Pension Fund Investments
J. David Cummins and Christopher M. Lewis
Financial innovation has dramatically expanded the variety of assets avail-
able to investors over the past two decades. Assets that formerly were held
on-balance-sheet by banks, insurers, other financial institutions, and indus-
trial firms, are now actively traded in securities markets. Moreover, the
types of cash flows that are traded in financial markets have expanded
significantly beyond traditional categories and now encompass many new
asset-backed securities and derivative instruments.1 Other chapters in this
volume have focused on the integration of capital market instruments into
traditional pension and annuity contracts as a means of expanding individual
investor investment opportunities (Maurer and Schlag, Chapter 9; Turner
and Rajnes, Chapter 12; Vetzal, Forsyth, and Windcliff, Chapter 10; Walliser,
Chapter 11) and the difficulty that many individual investors have in under-
standing these contracts (Bodie, Chapter 2). This chapter focuses on the
potential opportunity that these new securities offer for more sophisticated
institutional investors charged with optimally investing pension fund assets
on behalf of individual investors.
The expansion in the number and types of assets traded in the market-
place provides unprecedented opportunities for institutional investors to
improve the risk-return performance of their pension portfolios. Securities
have been introduced to trade the risk in ‘‘exotic underlyings,’’ including
catastrophic property losses (CAT bonds and options), temperature risk
(weather derivatives), and other unconventional risks. Yet, many of the new
securities are unfamiliar and complex, and they may expose investors to risks
that are not fully understood.2 As a result, investment managers, concerned
about fiduciary responsibilities and beating market index benchmarks, have
a disincentive to take positions in these assets unless they can be convinced
that they clearly help their portfolio performance. With little price trans-
parency and few tools for analyzing the risks inherent in the new assets,
The authors would like to thank John Kalamarides, Olivia Mitchell, and Kent Smetters for
helpful comments on the chapter. The authors accept responsibility for all errors or omissions.
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investment managers often pass on these securities and forego the material
diversification benefits offered by these structures.
The purpose of this chapter is to help resolve some of the uncertainty
associated with the innovative securitized products available in today’s fin-
ancial markets by providing information on some of the most promising
new assets that have emerged from the securitization process. We outline
the characteristics of these new securities, analyze their advantages and dis-
advantages, and provide a simplified approach for valuing these deals in
the context of the familiar linear capital asset pricing model (CAPM). We
focus primarily on asset-backed securities (ABS), which are the securitized
products most likely to be of interest to institutional investors. We also com-
ment on some particularly promising non-asset-backed derivative securities
recently introduced.
Our primary focus is to evaluate ABS from the perspective of enhancing
portfolio diversification within the pension fund, as opposed to developing
new hedging instruments for pension liability risks. From an asset-liability
management perspective, our analysis can be generalized to incorporate
the purchase of structured products that ‘‘hedge’’ the risk of pension liab-
ilities or pension asset concentrations. The practical problem of analyzing
pension fund hedging strategies with structured notes is that, short of a
few emerging mortality-linked notes that may be used to hedge pension
mortality risk, few structured products offer acceptable hedging benefits
for individual defined benefit pension funds as currently structured. Thus,
while our approach is sufficiently general to incorporate liability-motivated
structured note purchases, we defer a formal discussion of pension fund
hedging strategy to future research.
Background on the Development of Securitization
Securitization involves the repackaging and trading of cash flows that
traditionally would have been held on-balance-sheet by financial inter-
mediaries or industrials. Securitizations generally involve the agreement
between two parties to trade cash flow streams to manage and diversify
risk and/or to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. The cash flow
streams to be traded often involve contingent payments as well as more
predictable components that may be subject to credit and other types of
counterparty risk. Securitization provides a mechanism whereby contin-
gent and deterministically scheduled cash flow streams arising out of a
transaction can be unbundled and traded as separate financial instruments
that appeal to different classes of investors. In addition to facilitating risk
management, securitization transactions also add to the liquidity of fin-
ancial markets, replacing previously untraded on-balance-sheet assets with
tradable financial instruments.
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Securitization has been driven by both demand and supply factors.
Demand-driven securitization occurs when new risks emerge or when exist-
ing risks become more significant, rendering traditional hedging techniques
inadequate or obsolete. For example, the increasing levels and volatility of
interest rates during the late 1970s led to a demand by banks to liquidate
the mortgage loans on their balance sheets. Precedent for this type of secur-
itization had arisen during the late 1970s and early 1980s when government
institutions such as the Federal National Mortgage Association began to issue
securities backed by pools of mortgage loans. These mortgage-backed assets
were initially unattractive to many investors due to prepayment risk. A break-
through in mortgage securitization was the development of collateralized
mortgage obligations (CMOs) that unbundled the cash flows arising from
mortgage portfolios and repackaged the cash flows into various tranches
of bonds with different risk characteristics. This process provided securities
with greatly reduced prepayment risk that appealed to relatively risk averse
investors as well as riskier tranches that appealed to investors willing to take
more risk to earn higher returns. As a result, the market for US agency
mortgage backed securities grew from about $100 billion in 1980 to more
than $2.8 trillion by 2001.3
The emergence of new risks and the increasing magnitude of existing
risks on the demand side have led to a significant expansion in the markets
for interest rate, foreign exchange, commodity price, and credit derivatives.
The increasing property exposure in geographical areas prone to property
catastrophes such as hurricanes and earthquakes has led to the development
of securities designed to finance catastrophic risk, including CAT bonds and
options, which are discussed below. The exposure of energy companies and
other firms to risk from temperature fluctuations has led to the development
of an active market in weather-linked securities. Other innovations, such as
products that securitize cash flows from life insurance and annuities also
have begun to emerge.
Supply side factors also have influenced the growth of the market for
securitized financial instruments. The development of modern financial
theory, including option pricing models and models of the term structure
of interest rates, provided the basis for standardizing the pricing of many
financial products, facilitating the development of liquid markets. Simul-
taneously, rapid advances in computing and communications technologies
have enabled financial engineers to develop sophisticated new products at
an unprecedented rate.
Although the market for securitized financial products has experienced
remarkable advances, there are still obstacles to be overcome in order for
the more innovative and complex securitizations to be fully successful. To
a significant extent, the ability of markets to supply securitized financial
products has outrun the existing demand. In part, this is due to a lack of
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TABLE 13-1 Asset-Backed Securities: New Issuance Market Share by Asset Type,
2001 (Volume in $ US Billions)
Asset Type $ Volume Number of Deals Market Share (%)
Residential mortgage 142.9 374.0 18.9
Commercial mortgage 97.0 171.0 12.8
Credit cards 80.4 127.0 10.6
Corporate bonds 76.0 223.0 10.0
Sub-prime mortgages 65.2 134.0 8.6
Non-US home loans 59.9 123.0 7.9
Auto loans (prime) 52.0 57.0 6.9
Home-equity loans 38.5 78.0 5.1
Auto loans (sub-prime) 21.7 34.0 2.9
Equipment leases 17.0 53.0 2.2
Other 105.8 260.0 14.0
Total 756.4 1634 100.0
Source : Authors’ computations derived from asset-backed alert <www.abalert.com>.
understanding by investors of the parameters of the available contracts and
the role that such contracts can plan in improving portfolio performance.
However, there is also uncertainty about how to price the new products,
and there is still perhaps insufficient standardization within some of the
new classes of securities to permit the development of more liquid markets.
These problems can be expected to recede as issuers and investors gain
experience with the contracts and the market continues to mature.
During 2001, more than $756 billion in ABS was issued worldwide, a 34
percent increase over the $566 billion in ABS issued during 2000. An addi-
tional $55 billion in ABS was issued during January and February of 2002.
While almost $600 billion of the ABS issued in 2001 was placed in the United
States and benchmarked to US collateral, non-US ABS activity represents a
growing share of overall issuance---accounting for approximately 21 percent
of issuance volume in 2001.4
Not surprisingly, a majority of the new issuance volume, both in the United
States and overseas, continues to be backed by traditional assets. This is
shown in Table 13-1, which reports the 2001 worldwide ABS issuance by
asset type. The securitization of receivables backed by real estate, credit
cards, automobile loans, and corporate bonds, continues to represent over
80 percent of all new issuance in terms of dollar volume (83 percent) and
number of deals (81 percent):
1. The securitization of real estate assets, including prime residential
and commercial mortgages, sub-prime mortgages, non-US mortgages,
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home-equity loans and home-equity lines of credit (i.e. HELOC’s),
represented over half (53 percent) of all securitization activity in 2001
($403 billion).
2. The securitization of credit card assets was $80.4 billion or 10.6
percent of new issuance volume in 2001, maintaining a relatively con-
stant market share despite the deteriorating credit conditions in the
US economy and the problems faced by large issuers like Providian
Financial.
3. The securitization of corporate bonds through collateralized debt
obligation (CDOs) or collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) dropped
in 2001 to $76 billion or 10.1 percent of the total issuance volume---
down from $78.5 billion (13.9 percent) in 2000.
4. Automobile loan securitizations totaled $73.7 billion in 2001 for a
market share of just under 10 percent. Issuance volume in 2000 was
$67.3 billion, or just under 12 percent of the market.
Given the size of the market for traditional ABS, pension investment
managers usually have access to mark-to-market or mark-to-model pricing,
to value structures backed by traditional asset collateral. As such, pension
fund managers have a level of comfort in dealing with traditional ABS. The
focus of this chapter, however, is non-traditional ABS and innovative non-
asset backed products that have been introduced and where fund manager
familiarity is often less certain.
The Non-traditional ABS Market
How should pension fund managers evaluate non-traditional ABS securit-
ies? With names like Act-of-God bonds, Bowie bonds, Tobacco bonds, and
Kelvin Weather Derivatives, these structures have often gained considerable
public attention and interest in the market. Moreover, non-traditional ABS
represents a growing share of the overall ABS market. According to Standard
& Poor’s (S&P), non-traditional ABS (as defined herein), which represen-
ted 15 percent of the public ABS market in the United States in 1995, had
grown to 25 percent of the public ABS market by 2001 (Hu, Coyne, and
Elengical, 2002).
What are the risk-return dynamics of these securities? Are non-traditional
ABS an appropriate investment for pension fund managers? To address
these questions, we must first understand the structure of non-traditional
ABS, and then develop the tools needed to measure the risk-return dynamics
of these securities in the context of how pension fund managers measure
risk.
While often equipped with catchy marketing names, non-traditional ABS
are structured using the same format as traditional ABS. In any ABS struc-
ture, a company that is exposed to the risks associated with an uncertain set
of cash flows is looking to sell some or all of these risks to third-party investors
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Figure 13-1. Basic ABS structure. (Source: Authors’ derivation.)
in exchange for the risk-adjusted return available on these cash flows. The
motivations of the seller can range from regulatory arbitrage, to the need
to manage a concentration of risk on the balance sheet, to sourcing a lower
cost of funds for origination activity.
For example, the market for mortgage-backed securities developed in
the late 1970s and early 1980s as banks and thrifts---caught in the vice of
high funding costs and low yielding long-term mortgage assets---explored
options for reducing asset concentrations and lowering the funding costs
associated with mortgage origination. In a similar fashion, foreign competi-
tion and record delinquencies on automobile loans enticed the automobile
companies in the early to mid-1980s to use the automobile installment credit
as collateral and issue securitized car loans to obtain a cheaper source of
funding (Fink, 1998). Credit card issuers followed the same model, provid-
ing banks and financial companies with a lower cost alternative to retail
funding.
In the non-traditional ABS market, the range of underlying asset types and
risks can vary widely, and each deal merits individual attention. However,
as depicted in Figure 13-1, the basic structure for most ABS and structured
notes is the same. The sponsor of the program is looking to transfer a risk
associated with an asset or a liability to private sector investors. The under-
lying asset could be the right to future income streams, the value of a loan
portfolio, or an insurance portfolio. The corresponding risk that the spon-
sor is looking to transfer, which can be viewed as a financial option, could
be the risk of economic downturns on cash flows, credit deterioration in a
loan portfolio, or catastrophic property claims from an insurance portfolio.
In each of these cases, the sponsor is looking to sell these risks or options to
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private sector investors that are willing to take the risk in exchange for an
enhanced fixed-income return in the form of an option premium.
The economic rationale for these transactions is as follows: If investors
value the option as a diversifying asset, the risk premium that they demand
for underwriting the option risk will be lower than the internal funding
costs of a sponsor that has a concentration of this risk. The use of a special
purpose vehicle (SPV) in structuring the deal helps to ensure that investors
are protected against the bankruptcy risk of the sponsor, to provide for
transparent servicing of the assets/liabilities, to structure and collateralize
various tranches of debt, and to provide tax and accounting benefits to the
sponsor. All of these functions tend to be deal-specific. In addition, the SPV
insulates the investors from the agency costs and risks of the issuing firm’s
other operations, creating a ‘‘pure play’’ in the subject cash flows.
For a pension fund manager to evaluate a non-traditional ABS, therefore,
he must address three core questions:
1. Do I understand the dynamics of the risk being transferred in the deal?
2. What is the expected value of the loss being transferred and am I being
compensated for this expected loss?
3. Is this a diversifying asset in my portfolio and what is a fair risk premium
for underwriting this exposure?
To address these issues across a wide variety of asset classes would require
an entire volume. To keep the discussion manageable and to provide max-
imum value-added for institutional investors, we instead review the process
of evaluating non-traditional ABS in the context of the main growth areas
in asset-backed securitization.
Important Types of Non-Traditional ABS
An important challenge in the study of non-traditional ABS is that these new
structures are primarily privately placed, either directly or as a US Rule 144a
security.5 As such, obtaining a full list of transactions and obtaining accurate
information on any one transaction is difficult.6 Therefore, we focus here
on evaluating the five broad categories of non-traditional ABS that have
garnered the most attention in the market: credit-linked notes, insurance-
linked notes, aircraft securitizations, stranded cost securitizations, and
future cash flow securitizations.
Credit-Linked Notes
As the use of credit derivatives to buy and sell credit risk has expanded
over the past 5--8 years, some institutions have started issuing instruments
that combine traditional fixed income securities with an embedded credit
derivative within the same structured note. While these credit-linked notes
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have come in many forms, the basic premise behind the structure is simple:
a credit-linked note provides investors with an indirect opportunity to invest
in the return associated with a particular entity’s credit risk performance.
One of the principal drivers of the market for credit-linked notes is
investor demand for bypassing regulatory restrictions on credit risk under-
writing and risk-taking. For example, participation in the bank loan market
is restricted to regulated financial institutions within the United States.
Therefore, until the creation of the credit-linked note market, investors
in other industries could not diversify their risk exposure to the bank credit
market. With the advent of credit-linked notes, a wide variety of institutional
investors now can invest in bank loan credit risk.
There are two basic forms of credit-linked notes (Das, 1998):
1. Traditional structured notes where the coupon or principal is indexed
to the credit risk performance of an underlying reference credit. These
traditional structures include a variety of product variations, including
returns based on the total return of the reference credit, returns based
on the spread between the reference credit and a market return (e.g.
AA bond curve), and a return indexed to a credit default event.
2. Synthetic bonds that entail the use of embedded credit derivative
structures to replicate the fixed income security characteristics and
credit exposure of the underlying reference credit. Under this type
of structure, the investor receives a fixed income return provided
that the reference credit does not experience a ‘‘credit event’’
(e.g. bankruptcy). However, if the reference credit does have a default
event, the investor’s return would be adjusted to reflect the recovery
value of the reference credit’s debt.
To illustrate, an investor in a total return credit-linked note is essentially
entering into two simultaneous transactions (see Figure 13-2). First, the
investor invests in a floating rate note (FRN) indexed to a market return
like the London-Interbank-Offer Rate (LIBOR). Then, at the same time, the
investor matches the terms of the FRN with a total return swap whereby the
investor pays the FRN LIBOR and earns a rate of interest tied to the under-
lying reference credit. As such, the return earned by the investor matches
the total return associated with the reference credit. In simple terms, the
investor swaps his/her floating rate return for the return of the reference
credit.
Credit spread structured notes mirror the total return structured notes with
the exception that the investor enters into a credit derivative linked only
to the basis risk between the reference credit and an underlying index. As
such, the investor is only exposed to the relative credit performance of an
underlying reference credit to the market index. In both the total return
swap and credit-spread structures, the investor is able to leverage his return
and to short the underlying index.
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Figure 13-2. Credit-linked note. (Source: Authors’ derivation.)
In a credit-linked note with a credit default swap, the investor purchases a
portfolio of assets and then simultaneously enters into a credit default swap
agreement with respect to a referenced credit asset. In this case, the return to
the investor matches the portfolio of assets held in the trust of the structured
note trust until such time that the reference credit experiences a credit
default event. When this occurs, the trust has the right to substitute the
‘‘impaired’’ debt of the reference credit for the assets in the trust and the
investor earns a return linked to the defaulted reference credit.
For example, in one credit default swap structure, investors ostens-
ibly were investing in the bonds of the large California utility providers
(i.e. trust assets). Actually, the structured note included a credit default swap
whereby a default by a reference credit (i.e. Company ABC) would trigger
the substitution of the defaulted company’s debt into the trust in exchange
for the utility company’s debt---which presumably would be liquidated to
help cover losses at the defaulted company. As such, the investors’ return
was based on the return of the utility company debt up, until the occurrence
of a reference credit default, at which time the returns switched over to the
return on the impaired reference credit assets. Of course, if the reference
credit never defaulted the investors could earn a return equal to the util-
ity companies’ debt plus the option premium for underwriting Company
ABC’s credit risk.
Synthetic bond structures are designed to allow an investor to replicate an
investment in a given company’s debt instrument without having to pur-
chase that company’s debt. For example, JP Morgan structured a synthetic
bond structured note that paid investors a return (Treasury+65 basis points
(bps)) that was designed to replicate the return on WalMart’s debt. The
advantage of purchasing a synthetic bond, as opposed to the direct pur-
chase of WalMart’s debt, is that WalMart never actually had to issue any debt
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to be purchased. In addition, the investor can obtain structuring advant-
ages (e.g. enhanced credit rating of the structure) through the design of
the structured note (Das, 1998).
Another good illustration of the value of synthetic bond structures and
credit default swap structured notes, is the Sparc’s Trust that was issued
in the late 1990s. Under this structure, investors were able to purchase a
pool of assets with a credit default swap linked to Uruguayan debt. For
investors wanting to take a long position on Uruguayan debt but not having
the international infrastructure to support cross-border investments, this
structured security provided an ideal investment vehicle with a return of
LIBOR + 250 bps.
To date, a large share of the credit-linked note market has focused on
bank loans and public debt securities. However, there is growing interest
in formulating a secondary market for emerging market trade receivables
(EMTRs), which are letters of credit supporting international trade flows.
To date, EMTR securitizations have been limited to more traditional bank-
specific portfolios sales. However, growing interest on the part of exporters
and export financiers should help push this market forward in the near
future.
Insurance-Linked Notes: Property-Liability Risks
Paralleling the securitization of bank loans, several types of insurance-
linked securities have been developed over the years. Many of these
have been designed to provide additional risk capital to finance prop-
erty catastrophes from natural hazards such as hurricanes and earth-
quakes. The development of securitized instruments linked to property
catastrophes was primarily motivated by demand side considerations. Hur-
ricane Andrew in 1992 and the Northridge earthquake in 1994 resulted in
$30 billion in insured property losses and led insurers to drastically increase
their estimates of potential losses from property catastrophes. In fact,
these dramatic events were the most prominent manifestation of a sharp
increase in the frequency and severity of catastrophic loss events that began
in the 1980s. During the period 1970--86, the number of catastrophes
averaged about 35 per year. Beginning in 1987, however, the number of
catastrophes increased sharply, and from 1990 to 2001, the number of cata-
strophes exceeded 100 in every year (Swiss Re, 2002).7 From 1970 to 1986,
insured losses from natural catastrophes exceeded $5 billion in only 1 year,
and the average annual catastrophe loss for this period was $2.6 billion.
From 1987 to 2001, however, insured catastrophe losses exceeded $8 billion
in all but 2 years, and catastrophe losses averaged $14.3 billion per year
(Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips, 2002a).
As catastrophic losses continued to rise, it became increasingly apparent
that international reinsurance markets were not adequate for financing this
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type of loss. Insurance and reinsurance markets operate most successfully
in diversifying relatively small, frequent events, but are not well equipped
to handle large, infrequent events. Moreover, events that are large relat-
ive to the capacity of the insurance and reinsurance industries are small
relative to securities markets. For example, the $100 billion ‘‘Big One’’ in
Florida or California would represent approximately 75 percent of the equity
of the global reinsurance industry but would amount to less than half of
1 percent of the value of stocks and bonds traded on US securities markets.
Moreover, because the occurrence of natural catastrophes is not linked to
economic events, catastrophe-linked securities would be ‘‘zero-beta’’ assets
and hence very valuable to investors for diversification (Cantor, Cole, and
Sandor, 1996; Litzenberger, Beaglehole, and Reynolds, 1996). These factors
led to the recognition that securitization is likely to offer the most logical
and efficient solution to the catastrophic loss financing problem.
CAT-risk securities also are interesting because there is no traded under-
lying asset or commodity that can be used to trigger payment under
the securities. In the absence of a traded underlying, CAT-risk securities
have been structured to pay-off on three types of variables: issuer-specific
catastrophe loss criteria, insurance-industry catastrophe loss indices, and
parametric indices based on the physical characteristics of catastrophic
events. The choice of a triggering variable involves a trade-off between moral
hazard and basis risk (Doherty, 1997). Securities based on insurer-specific
(or hedger-specific) losses have low basis risk but expose investors to moral
hazard, whereas securities based on industry loss indices or parametric trig-
gers greatly reduce or eliminate moral hazard but expose hedgers to basis
risk.8 Additionally, index-linked securities are more easily standardized than
issue-specific instruments, thus providing the potential for the development
of a more liquid market in index-linked contracts.
The first catastrophe insurance derivative contracts were introduced by
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), which began listing catastrophic loss
futures contracts in 1992. The CBOT contracts eventually evolved into
option spreads that settled on insurance-industry loss indices compiled by
Property Claims Services (PCS), an insurance industry statistical agent.9
Although the CBOT options are no longer traded due to low trading
volume (mainly due to lack of interest in the options by insurers), they
represent an important innovation and are likely to provide the model for
exchange traded options that almost certainly will be developed in future
years.10
Currently, catastrophe bonds account for the greatest amount of risk cap-
ital raised in the catastrophe securities market. Unlike the CBOT options,
the CAT bonds issued to date are ABS analogous to the credit-linked
products discussed above. The first successful CAT bond was an $85 million
issue by Hannover Re in 1994 (Swiss Re, 2001). The first CAT bond issued
by a non-financial firm, occurring in 1999, covers earthquake losses in
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Figure 13-3. Pure catastrophe bond. (Source: Authors’ derivation.)
the Tokyo region for Oriental Land Company Ltd., the owner of Tokyo
Disneyland.
Under a very general catastrophe bond structure, shown in Figure 13-3,
investors purchase debt securities from an insurer (or an insurance trust)
in exchange for a nominal interest yield that compensates investors both
for the use of their funds and for an embedded option that allows the
insurer to reduce the yield (either through a reduction in principal and/or
interest payments) if a predefined disaster event occurs during a preset
exposure period. Stated differently, catastrophe bonds expose investors’
principal and/or interest to loss in the event of a pre-specified natural
disaster event. In return, investors receive a higher yield reflecting the
embedded call option (on principal and/or interest payments) held by the
insurer. In principle, this structure is no different from a credit default swap
except that the underlying reference portfolio is basket of insurance risks
instead of loans and the triggering event is a natural disaster loss instead of a
credit default.
A good illustration of a CatBond structure is the catastrophe bond pro-
gram established in 1997 by the US property-liability insurer USAA to
transfer the risk of large-scale hurricane losses from the insurer to investors.
USAA structured the CatBond so that investors earned an above market-
yield on the notes, but were exposed to losing principle and/or interest
if hurricane losses for USAA exceeded $1 billion (Lewis and Davis, 1998).
If hurricane losses for USAA exceeded $1 billion, investors would have to
cover 80 percent of USAA’s hurricane losses in excess of $1 billion through
foregone interest or principal payments on their notes.11 The total payout
by investors was capped, however, at $400 million. USAA retained the risk
of hurricane losses below $1 billion, losses above $1.5 billion, and the 20
percent of losses not covered by investors in the $1.0--1.5 billion layer of
protection provided by the CatBond.12
In implementing CatBond structures, however, insurers and investors
often prefer to segregate the underlying liabilities in an insurance-linked
note through the use of a special purpose reinsurer (SPR). Insurers prefer
the use of a SPR to capture the tax and accounting benefits associated with
traditional reinsurance. The SPR also keeps the transaction off the insurer’s
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Figure 13-4. CatBond with SPR. (Source: Authors’ derivation.)
balance sheet and hence does not change its capital structure. Investors
prefer the use of a SPR to isolate the risk of their investment in the secured
assets or liabilities from the general business and insolvency risks of the
insurer. As a result, the issuer of the securitization can realize a higher
return from the sale of assets or liabilities through segregation. The trans-
action also is more transparent than a debt issue by the insurer, because
the funds are held in trust and are released according to carefully defined
criteria.
The structure of a CAT bond with a SPR and trust is shown in Figure 13-4.
Once established, the SPR provides traditional reinsurance to the insurer
for the pre-specified insurance risks being ‘‘securitized.’’ The insurer also
retains a residual interest in the SPR to ensure that the arrangement is fully
recognized as reinsurance for regulatory and tax purposes. However, unlike
traditional reinsurance firms, the SPR is financed through the placement
of catastrophe bonds issued directly to investors. Proceeds from the sales of
the securities to the investors and the insurer’s premium payments for the
catastrophe coverage are then placed in a trust, usually established in the
United States. Funds from the trust can be released only to pay the issuing
insurer’s claims or to make payments on the bonds. This structure assures
investors that they are not exposed to other risks inherent in the issuing
insurer’s book of business that would prevent it from repaying the bond
were it issued direct by the insurer rather than the SPR.
The funds in the trust are invested in safe securities such as Treasury
bonds. The investors receive the interest on the assets in the trust and a risk
premium paid into the trust by the insurer. The risk premia on most CAT
bonds issued to date have been in the range of 400--600 bps, and it is not
unusual for the risk premium to be five or six times the expected value of the
covered catastrophe loss (Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips, 2002b). These
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high premia, which have made the bonds very attractive to investors, pose a
pricing puzzle: That is, if CAT risk is truly ‘‘zero-beta,’’ then the bonds should
yield approximately the expected loss plus the risk-free rate of interest, not
several times the expected loss. Possible explanations for the high premia
include investor unfamiliarity with the contracts (a ‘‘novelty’’ premium),
the low liquidity of the contracts issued to date (a liquidity premium), and
investor uncertainty about the accuracy of the models used to estimate
expected losses (a ‘‘modeling risk’’ premium). In addition, although the
catastrophic events observed in the United States to date have been uncor-
related with returns in securities markets (Litzenberger, Beaglehole, and
Reynolds, 1996), it is not clear that this lack of correlation also would exist
for a $100 billion plus ‘‘Big One.’’ It is possible that such a large event might
have repercussions that could drive down securities prices, creating system-
atic risk for CAT securities. An extra premium for this type of risk might be
characterized as a ‘‘hidden-beta’’ premium.
The CAT bonds that have been issued to date are summarized in
Table 13-2. The table shows forty-two securitizations that account for over
$5.5 billion in risk capital. Most of the transactions are limited to coverage of
hurricanes and/or earthquakes, although fifteen are multiline, indicating
that they could be triggered by events from other lines of insurance. The
issues have ranged in value from $10 to $500 million, and nearly all have
been privately placed.
Insurers also have hedged property-liability risk using other types of
securitizations, including contingent capital/surplus note financings and
option/swap contracts. A contingent capital transaction is structured sim-
ilarly to a CAT bond, except that the financing event triggered by the
contingency is an equity capital issue. For example, assume that an insurer
issues contingent capital securities to investors. As in the case of a CAT bond,
the funds from the capital issue are placed in a trust and invested in safe
securities. If the triggering event occurs, the insurer is permitted to with-
draw funds from the trust and to replace the funds with contingent capital
certificates or surplus notes.13 There is usually a provision for retiring the
surplus notes according to a specified schedule. Thus, investors are exposed
to the ultimate credit risk of the issuer (i.e. the risk that the notes will not be
retired as promised) but otherwise will not lose their principal as the result
of the occurrence of the covered event. The contingent capital transactions
to date are summarized in Table 13-3. There have been sixteen transac-
tions, raising a total of $4.5 billion in risk capital. All contingent capital
transactions to date have been privately placed.
There also have been several option/swap securitizations covering
property-liability risks. One model for this type of securitization is the cata-
strophic equity put option, where an insurer purchases a catastrophe put
option from investors in return for an option premium. This derivative
gives the insurer the right to issue a specified number of shares (usually
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TABLE 13-2 Natural Disaster Catastrophe Bonds ($ US Millions)
Issue Issuer Year $ Millions Risk
Georgetown Re St. Paul Re 1996 69.0 Multi-line
AIG AIG 1996 25.0 Multi-line
Winterthur Winterthur Re 1997 282.0 Wind
SLF I Reliance 1997 20.0 Multi-line
SLF II Reliance 1997 20.0 Multi-line
Residential Re I USAA 1997 477.0 Wind
SR Earthquake Swiss Re 1997 137.0 EQ
Parametric Re Tokio Marine & Fire 1997 100.0 EQ
Trinity Re I Centre Re 1998 84.0 Wind
SLF III Reliance 1998 25.0 Multi-line
Pacific Re Yasuda Fire & Marine 1998 80.0 Wind
Residential Re II USAA 1998 450.0 Wind
Mosaic Re I F& G Re 1998 54.0 Multi-line
Trinity Re II Centre Re 1998 57.0 Wind
Mosaic Re II F& G RE 1999 46.0 Multi-line
SLF IV Reliance 1999 10.0 Multi-line
Domestic Re Kemper 1999 100.0 EQ
Halyard Re Sorema SA 1999 17.0 Multi-line
Concentric Re Oriental Land Co. 1999 100.0 EQ
Residential Re III USAA 1999 200.0 Wind
Juno Re Gerling 1999 80.0 Wind
Namazu Re Gerling 1999 100.0 EQ
Golden Eagle Re AmRe 1999 182.0 Multi-line
Seismic Lehman Re 2000 145.5 EQ
Atlas Re SCOR 2000 200.0 Multi-line
Halyard Re Sorema SA 2000 17.0 Multi-line
Alpha Wind Arrow Re/State Farm 2000 90.0 Wind
Residential Re IV USAA 2000 200.0 Wind
NeHi Vesta 2000 50.0 Wind
Mediterranean Re AGF 2000 129.0 Wind/EQ
Prime Capital Munich Re 2000 300.0 Wind/EQ
Western Capital Swiss Re 2001 100.0 EQ
Golden Eagle Re II American Re 2001 120.0 Wind/EQ
Halyard Re Sorema SA 2001 17.0 Multi-line
SR Wind Swiss Re 2001 120.0 Wind
Trinom Ltd Zurich Re 2001 161.9 Multi-line
Mediterranean Re AGF 2001 129.0 Wind/EQ
Redwood Capital Lehman Re 2001 160.5 EQ
Atlas II SCOR 2001 N/A Wind/EQ
Munich Re Open 2002 500.0 Multi-line
CEA Open 2002 100.0 EQ
Swiss Re Open 2002 300.0 ---
Total 5554.9
Sources: Swiss Re (2001), Lane (2000, 2001).
Note : EQ = Earthquake, Wind = Hurricane/Windstorm.
“chap13” — 2003/6/4 — page 283 — #16
13 / Securitized Risk Instruments 283
TABLE 13-3 Contingent Capital/Surplus Notes (Volume in $ US
Millions)
Issuer Year $ Millions Risk
Nationwide 1995 400.0 N/A
Hannover Re---Kover 1995 85.0 Multi-line
Arkwright 1995 100.0 N/A
FWUA 1995 1,500.0 Wind
Hawaii Hurricane 1995 500.0 Wind
RLI 1996 50.0 Multi-line
Horace Mann 1996 100.0 Multi-line
LaSalle Re 1997 100.0 Multi-line
CEA 1997 700.0 EQ
Lloyds 1998 40.0 Multi-line
Oriental Land Co. 1999 100.0 EQ
Pacific Electric 2000 120.0 Credit
Michelin 2000 170.0 GDP
US Consulting 2000 250.0 N/A
Royal Bank of Canada 2000 200.0 Credit
Countrywide 2000 100.0 Credit
Total 4,515.0
Sources: Authors’ computations from Swiss Re (2001), Lane (2000, 2001).
Note : EQ = Earthquake, Wind = Hurricane/Windstorm.
preferred stock) at an agreed upon price contingent on the occurrence of
a specified catastrophe event. If the insurer’s stock price drops below the
option strike price as the result of a catastrophe, the insurer can replenish its
equity capital by issuing shares at the strike price. Options have an advantage
over CAT bonds in that they do not tie up pools of capital in trust. However,
options expose the insurer to counterparty credit risk, and the issue of shares
following an event dilutes the insurer’s equity capital. For investors, these
options should be attractive as long as the option premium is sufficient to
compensate for the risk. However, because they are off-balance sheet trans-
actions, investing in options/swaps may create regulatory problems for some
types of institutional investors.
The option/swap contracts issued to date are shown in Table 13-4. There
have been twenty transactions, raising $4.8 billion in risk capital. Aggreg-
ating the CAT bonds, contingent capital, and options/swap transactions in
Tables 13-2, 13-3, and 13-4 gives a total of seventy-eight transactions that have
raised nearly $15 billion in risk capital. Clearly, these securities have been
viewed as attractive by both issuers and investors, and there is significant
potential for the future development of this market.
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TABLE 13-4 Property-Liability Linked Options/Swaps (Volume in $ US
Millions)
Issuer Year $ Millions Risk
Hannover Re (K2) 1996 100.0 Multi-line
CAT LTD 1997 35.0 Wind
Mitsui Marine 1998 35.0 EQ
AXA 1998 40.0 EQ
XL Mid-Ocean 1998 200.0 Multi-line
Constitution Re 1998 10.0 Wind
CNA 1998 115.0 Wind
FIFA World Cup 1998 3,000.0 EQ
Societe Generale 1998 45.0 EQ
Societe Generale 1998 100.0 EQ
Reliance National 1998 40.0 Multi-line
AXA 1998 21.0 EQ
Allianz 1998 150.0 Wind
Hannover Re (K2+) 1998 50.0 Multi-line
CNA 1999 50.0 EQ
Lehman Re 1999 111.0 EQ
Tokio Marine/Arrow Re 2000 200.0 EQ
WestLB 2000 45.0 N/A
Tokio Marine/Swiss Re 2001 450.0 EQ/Wind
FIFA/ Munich Re 2001 50.0 EQ
Total 4,847.0
Sources: Authors’ computations from Swiss Re (2001), Lane (2000, 2001).
Note : EQ = Earthquake, Wind = Hurricane/Windstorm.
Insurance-Linked Notes: Life Insurance/Annuity Risks
Unlike the property-liability insurance industry, securitization in the life
insurance industry has been relatively rare. To date, we are aware of only
five successful securitization transactions involving life insurance assets (see
Table 13-5), and four of these were ‘‘closed block’’ securitizations completed
by one reinsurance company, Hannover Re.14 Under a ‘‘closed block’’ secur-
itization, an insurance company segregates the life insurance policies and
the associated assets of a given volume of business. The assets and liabilities
are then sold to investors through an ABS structure. Through this mechan-
ism, an insurance company can effectively originate a block of business and
then ‘‘sell’’ that business block directly to investors through a securitization
structure.
Life insurance securitizations are motivated by insurer needs to recapture
funds expended in writing new life insurance. The need arises because the
expense of writing new life insurance policies is generally incurred by the
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TABLE 13-5 Life Insurance and Annuity Securitizations (Volume in $ US
Millions)
Issue Issuer Year $ Millions Risk
ASLAC Funding
Trust I
American Skandia 1996 42.0 Annuity fees
Prudential Prudential 1996 175.0 Mutual fund fees
ASLAC Funding
Trust II
American Skandia 1997 158.0 Annuity fees
Interpolis Re Hannover Re 1998 57.0 Closed life block
Mutual
Securitization
National Provident
Life
1998 438.0 Open life block
ASLAC Funding
Trust
American Skandia 1998 111.0 Annuity fees
Interpolis Re Hannover Re 1999 250.0 Closed life block
Whiterock Hannover Re 1999 49.0 Closed life block
L4
Securitization
Hannover Re 2000 182.0 Closed life block
Total 1,462.0
Sources: Authors’ computations from Swiss Re (2001), Lane (2000, 2001).
insurer in the first policy year and then amortized over the term of the
policy. Thus, writing new business can create liquidity problems for life
insurers. In addition, regulatory accounting requirements usually result in
an increase in insurer leverage associated with new business. Consequently,
one motivation for life insurance securitizations is to reduce leverage and
obtain immediate access to the ‘‘profits’’ expected to emerge from a block of
life insurance policies. The advantage for the insurance company is access to
cheaper financing and the ability to bypass regulatory capital requirements
associated with keeping the business on the company’s balance sheet. In
a series of transactions (known as L1--L4) dating back to 1998, Hannover
Re has used ‘‘closed block’’ securitizations to sell four large blocks of life,
health, and personal accident reinsurance in the market. The latest sale
involved $182 million of life, health, and personal accident in December
of 2000.
A more innovative life insurance securitization approach is the direct
sale of interests in ‘‘open blocks’’ of life insurance policies underwritten
by an insurance company. In an open block securitization of life insurance
policies, a SPV is established to make a loan to the operating unit of an insur-
ance company in return for the right to the surpluses expected to ‘‘emerge’’
on a specified block of life insurance policies. Emerging surpluses constitute
the residual value within a block of life insurance policies at the end of each
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policy year, after subtracting dividends to policyholders. The present value
of these emergent surpluses across future policy years represents the present
value of future profits from the life insurance block. The SPV, therefore, is
funded through the issuance of floating and fixed rate structured notes
placed directly in the capital markets with investors interested in taking a
position in the present value of future profits on these life insurance policies
(Standard & Poor’s, 2001).
In May of 1998, National Provident Insurer (NPI), a UK life insurance
company, became the first company to successfully securitize an open block
of life insurance policies. In this structure NPI, sold $438 million of life
insurance policies through an SPV called Mutual Securitization PLC. The
limited recourse bonds used to fund the SPV were rated A-by S&P and
divided into Class A1 and A2 securities that carried terms of 14 and 24 years,
respectively. Similar to the securitization of mutual fund asset fees, the main
profit driver of emerging surplus in this transaction was the management
fee levied by NPI on the portfolio fund backing these policies.15
While NPI remains the only open block life insurance securitization that
has been successfully placed in the market, interest in life insurance securit-
ization is once again drawing the attention of leading investment banks. In
fact, it has been reported that Prudential Financial is exploring the oppor-
tunity to securitize up to $1.5 billion in portfolio life insurance policies.16
Unlike closed block transactions, the direct securitization of life insurance
emerging surplus enables insurance companies to ‘‘sell’’---and investors to
buy---the pure risk of adverse mortality and morbidity developments in its
underwriting. Of course, mortality rates tend to remain extremely stable
over time. Thus, the interest in life insurance securitization centers around
the desire of life insurance companies to find capital-saving approaches to
manage the risk of ‘‘catastrophic’’ changes in mortality rates, presumably
from plagues, famine, large scale conflagrations, or terrorist attacks. In
this context, the motivational factors behind the insurer demand for open
block securitizations of life insurance are analogous to factors underlying
the CatBond market for property--casualty insurance.
Credit-Insurance
Parallel to the development of credit-linked notes, insurance companies
have been exploring strategies for securitizing the risks associated with
portfolio credit insurance. In the market for alternative risk transfer, rein-
surance companies have spent the last few years developing a wide variety
of innovative products to insure the portfolio credit risk exposures of both
corporates and financial services firms. Examples of these innovative new
policies include the $200 million in contingent capital protection against
portfolio credit risk to the Royal Bank of Canada in January of 2001; the
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$260 million of surety bond protection provided to ResidenSea Ltd; and the
$159 million excess-of-loss policy provided to the Paris Bourse in the event
of that member defaults and losses exceed $180 million. Coupled with tra-
ditional credit risk insurance products, this growth of insurance company
credit exposure also has increased the demand for insurance companies
to develop new approaches for securitizing the resulting concentrations of
credit risk in their portfolios.
To find a precedent for the securitization of portfolio credit risk from
an insurance company, however, we must once more look to Europe. In
April of 1999, Gerling Financial successfully placed $455 million worth of
credit-linked notes in the market through a novel structure called SECTRS.
In the SECTRS transaction, Gerling was able to lay off large concentrations
of European credit risk exposure associated with the firm’s credit insur-
ance operations through an indexed structure similar to JP Morgan’s Bistro
Credit-linked notes. The transaction allowed investors to participate directly
in the credit risk performance of small-to medium-sized European compan-
ies through an indexed measure of industry default experience based on the
default experience of 92,000 European firms. Arranged in the sequential
layers, the SECTRS transaction exposed investors to varying levels of risk
pegged to the annual and 3-year cumulative default experience of an index
of European company defaults.
AQ: Pls.
chk. if
change Ok
• Tranche A---totaled $245.5 million, was rated AA2, and carried a yield
of Euribor + 45 bp.
• Tranche B---totaled $127.5 million, was rated AA2, and carried a yield
of Euribor + 82.
• Tranche C---totaled $ 82.0 million, was rated BBB, and carried a yield
of Euribor + 170.
The payoff of principal and interest in each tranche was tied to a specific
set of default rates based on a European default rate index. The trigger
points for annual default rates on Tranche A, B, and C were set to 3.3,
2.6, and 2.1 percent, respectively. Cumulative default rate trigger points
for Tranches A, B, and C were set at 6.6, 5.9, and 5.4 percent, respectively.
Gerling was left with the responsibility for managing the basis risk between
the European industry index and the firm’s portfolio exposure, as well as
bearing the first layer of loss associated with defaults for the portfolio up to
a level of a 2.1 percent annual default loss (approximately $325 million in
exposure).
The structure of the transaction was similar to a credit-linked structured
note with an embedded portfolio credit default swap. Proceeds from the
sale of the structured notes were used to purchase US Treasury securities
and AAA-rated German Agency bonds to collateralize and meet the interest
and principal payments on the underlying notes. Gerling then purchased
an interest rate swap to convert the fixed-rate collateral bonds into a floating
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rate payment for investors. In the event that a default trigger was pierced,
Gerling would be able to liquidate some of the underlying collateral in
the trust to cover credit insurance losses within its portfolio. As a result,
the reduction in the underlying collateral within the trust would reduce
the principal and interest payments to the affected investors of the SECTRs
securities.
Weather-Linked Securities
Another developing market is the market for weather derivatives and
for structured notes that embed weather derivatives in an ABS structure.
Weather derivatives are another example of derivatives on ‘‘exotic under-
lyings.’’ Although various weather-related indices could undoubtedly be
constructed, most contracts traded to date settle on indices of the number
of heating degree days (HDD) for contracts hedging against relatively warm
temperatures (e.g. a natural gas producer) or cooling degree days (CDD)
for contracts hedging against relatively low temperatures (e.g. an electri-
city producer hedging against low demand for air conditioning). Weather
derivatives have been sold over-the-counter, and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) now offers HDD and CDD futures and options on ten US
cities, although transactions volume has been low to date.
As an example of a weather derivative consider a HDD futures contract
on the Philadelphia weather index purchased on the CME. The CME HDD
index is an accumulation of HDDs over a calendar month, valued at $100
per tick (day). A daily HDD is defined as Max[65◦ Fahrenheit-daily average
temperature, 0]. If the number of HDDs during November in Philadelphia
accumulated to 600, the nominal value of a futures contract on the index
would be $60,000. A natural gas company might decide to hedge using
put options on the index. If it bought December puts with a strike price
of 900 (approximately the average HDDs in Philadelphia in December), it
would collect the following amount on each option: P = 100 × Max[900 −
IHDDP, 0], where IHDDP is the realized value of the Philadelphia HDD index
for that month. For example, if the actual number of HDDs was 750, the
hedger would collect $15,000 per put option. Of course, many other types
of derivatives, including swaps, caps, floors, etc., could be traded based on
weather related risks.
Asset-backed securities also can be structured with embedded weather
derivatives. Similar to the development of the credit-linked note and the
CatBond market, weather-linked ABS could be beneficial to both the issu-
ing company and the investor. For the issuer, the note can be structured
using a SPV that allows the ceding company to obtain the favorable tax
and accounting advantages of insurance. For investors, the structured note
would provide a low cost means for taking positions in the weather market
that are currently not feasible given the limited market infrastructure for
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weather derivatives. A market-leader in this area is Koch Energy Trading. In
a two-tranche structured note dubbed Kelvin, Koch was able to securitize a
$50 million portfolio of weather derivatives tied to degree-day measures in
the United States in December of 1999.
• Tranche A---totaled $21.6 million, provided first event coverage, carried
a B-rating, and was priced at LIBOR + 1570.
• Tranche B---totaled $23.0 million, provided second event coverage, was
rated BBB, and was priced at LIBOR + 870.
Other deals that have been examined but withdrawn or held back include
insurance-linked notes tied to rainfall precipitation (e.g. Nicaraguan
drought or deluge) and snowmelt and/or river water level exposure (e.g.
United Kingdom or Bangladesh).
Aircraft-backed Debt and Lease Securitization
An interesting class of investments that has flourished recently represents
securities backed by aircraft assets and aircraft lease programs. Aircraft-
backed securities now come in a variety of forms for investors, but for
convenience, we can classify these securities within four basic structures:
Equipment Trust Certificates (ETCs), Enhanced Equipment Trust Cer-
tificates (EETCs), Aircraft Lease Portfolio Securitizations (ALPS), and
securitized pools of aircraft loans. The risks associated with aircraft-backed
loans are very unique from other types of loan structures. However, the basic
structure of a securitized pool of aircraft loans is the same as a traditional
CLO. Our discussion focuses on the first three types of aircraft ABS.
Equipment Trust Certificates
For airline companies, a substantial portion of their debt funding capacity
historically has been tied up in the financing of aircraft purchases (e.g.
Boeing 747s). Furthermore, the funding costs of aircraft purchases have
been tied directly to the credit rating of the airline company. The question
for the airline companies, therefore, was whether there was a means to
leverage the residual value of a purchased aircraft to reduce the debt funding
costs associated with the purchase? The answer was ETC.
In issuing ETCs, an airline company uses an arms-length SPV to issue
secured debt to private investors to finance the purchase of aircraft assets.
In the transaction, however, the airline company transfers its interest in
the property rights of the aircraft and all related property rights (e.g. lease
returns) to the SPV trust as security for repayment of the limited-recourse
notes.17 Investors are then granted a first priority perfected security interest
in the aircraft and any associated collateral, and are entitled to secure the
benefits of favorable payment treatment in the event of a bankruptcy by
the airline.18 The investor interest in the aircraft collateral translates into
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enhanced recovery rate prospects on the debt in the event of a default
by the sponsoring airline. As such, the secured debt is usually rated 1--2
notches above the corporate rating of the airline and the airline benefits
from a lower-cost financing of the aircraft purchase. Northwest was one of
the first airlines to issue ETCs in 1994, but several large deals followed the
Northwest deal as more airlines took advantage of this lower cost funding
mechanism.
Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificates
Given the funding cost savings that were realized through the issuance
of ETCs, the airline companies started to explore alternative structuring
options in an attempt to further enhance the credit rating of the debt secur-
ities and lower the acquisition costs of aircraft assets. What evolved out of
this exploration was a more highly levered secured debt structure known
as EETCs. While the basic premise behind the EETCs remained consistent
with the original ETCs, these new structures used tranching and flexible
payment terms to convert the collateral of the aircraft into a reduced prob-
ability of default---as opposed to an improved recovery rate in the event
of default. This approach yielded more favorable credit ratings and lower
funding costs.
The main features that were added to EETCs to effect this trade-off of
collateral enhanced ratings were as follows:
1. Debt tranching---providing various levels of over-collateralization.
2. Dedicated liquidity facilities that could continue debt service (usually
just interest only) payments during the time required for the trust to
repossess and sell aircraft collateral to payoff the debt obligations in
the event of a default---up to a maximum of 18 months.
3. Soft amortization terms that allowed an extension in the repayment of
principal up to a maximum final maturity date.
4. Reliance on improved legal mechanisms for assuring access to the
underlying collateral.
The basic advantage of the last three features listed above was to give
the trust sufficient flexibility to determine the optimum timing of selling
repossessed assets into the market place. Early ETC and portfolio secur-
itization transactions that resulted in asset repossession and liquidation
demonstrated the risk associated with trying to accomplish a forced asset sale
during a down market in the value of airline assets. The flexibility accorded
to the trust in an EETC was an attempt to avoid an asset ‘‘fire sale,’’ thereby
recognizing greater value in the transaction.
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Aircraft Lease Portfolio Securitization
While airline companies were looking for novel ways to lower their cost
of aircraft acquisition, aircraft manufacturers and aircraft leasing compan-
ies also were exploring ways to securitize leasing programs. In an aircraft
lease program, the aircraft manufacturer leases a plane to an airline for
commercial use over a fixed period of time on an operating lease basis.
During this period, the airline company has an option to put the plane
back to the aircraft manufacturer before the end of the lease term under
conditions of financial stress. As a result, aircraft lease programs carry sig-
nificant contingent market risks for the manufacturer, especially since the
development of adverse circumstances for lessees is likely to be correlated
with airline industry recessions when releasing and residual aircraft values
are lower. With roughly 2,500 of the 12,500 total outstanding commercial
aircraft worldwide being financed through lease programs, the extent of
this risk---and the opportunity for cost savings with a new ABS structure---was
substantial. As a result, the industry developed ALPS (Bowers, 2002).
Under an ALPS, the aircraft manufacturer issues securities through a
SPV that grants investors rights to the lease receivables of a portfolio of
leased aircraft, as well as the net residual value of the aircraft in the lease
portfolio at lease termination. In the transfer, the special purpose trust
retains the property rights to the lease income and the residual value of
the aircraft to support the payment of debt service to investors. Meanwhile,
the investors accept the contingent liability of the lease program. The main
risk to investors, therefore, is the joint event where airlines default on their
lease obligations during a period in which the value of the leased aircraft
falls below a level needed to meet debt service obligations.
A key distinction between ALPS and ETCs, however, is that the credit
quality of the transaction is not tied a rating of the underlying sponsor,
but instead it is based on the level of diversification in the lease portfolio
(i.e. number of airlines, aircraft types, and countries), the robustness of
the aircraft technology, the reputation of the manufacturer, the quality of
the lease servicer, and the expected market liquidity for the aircraft assets.
Furthermore, while the trust has the authority to sell the aircraft to support
debt service payments to investors, the presumption in a lease securitization
is that lease terminations will be replaced with new leases. Other structuring
options have evolved in a similar fashion to EETCs.
The first portfolio securitization of airplane receivables was a $521 million
issue in June of 1992 that was called Aircraft Lease Portfolio Securitiza-
tion Limited 92-1 (‘‘ALPS 92-1’’). In this transaction, the sponsor (the GPA
Group) securitized the lease receivables associated with fourteen different
planes, fourteen different lessees, and twelve countries. The aircrafts were
sold to ALPS 92-1 in ‘‘true-sale’’ format and the SPV issued $417 million in
senior (three classes) and mezzanine debt. The ALPS 92-1 debt was to be
repaid from aircraft sales in the last 18 months of the program, but failure to
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meet aircraft sales goals eventually forced a refinancing of the debt in 1996
(ALPS 96-1) (Bowers, 2002). The experience of ALPS 92-1 was important
in illustrating the risks in an aircraft securitization structure based on the
residual value of the aircraft---the risks that the market value of the leased air-
craft will fall below a level required to finance the payment of the securities
financing the structure.
A second major ALPS issuance in 1994, Aircraft Lease Portfolio Securit-
ization 94-1, presented an important improvement on the original aircraft
lease securitization model. ALPS 94-1 was a $854 million issue backed by a
lease portfolio of twenty-seven aircrafts, twenty-two lessees in fourteen coun-
tries. Legally, the structure was similar to ALPS 92-1. However, in the event
that low market valuations of the leased aircraft did not support the sched-
uled retirement of the trust’s debt, the trust had the authority to extend the
maturity of the debt at a higher interest rate. This feature allowed the trust
to avoid a forced sale of the leased aircraft in a down market---exacerbating
the decline in the residual value of the aircraft and forcing a restructuring
of the debt.
Another major hurdle in aircraft securitization was crossed in 1997, with
the $4.1 billion securitization issued by Airplanes Trust Delaware and Air-
planes Limited Jersey (‘‘Airplanes Group’’). This deal, which marked the
largest to date, involved the lease securitization of 229 aircrafts on lease to
83 lessees in 40 countries. The novelty in this transaction was that the struc-
ture involved the transfer of bankruptcy-remote SPVs that held the aircraft
as opposed to the physical transfer of the aircraft themselves. (Similar deals
are also taking place with respect to automobile leasing programs.)
In terms of the yield opportunity for investors, we can look at the 1997
ALPS issued by Pegasus Aircraft Lease Securitization and the June 2001 issue
by Triton-ABD.
1. Pegasus issued $119 million in 7-year securities backed by airplane
lease receivables in May of 1997. The issue was divided into a
BBB-rated tranche of $99 million and a BB-/Ba3-rated tranche of
$20 million. The BBB-rated tranche carried a fixed rate of interest
of 8.6 percent; while the junior tranche had a rate of 11.76 percent.
The interesting aspect of the Pegasus transaction was that fortunate
circumstances in the timing of lease terminations and aircraft sales
in a strong aircraft market actually generated unexpectedly strong
returns for investors. Unfortunately, the prospect of these high returns
is also informative of the potential for strong negative returns in down
markets.
2. Triton issued $805 million in 25-year securities backed by airplane lease
receivables. The transaction covered a geographically diverse portfolio
of lease receivables with the top 5 markets being France (15 percent),
the United Kingdom (14.4 percent), the United States (14.3 percent),
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Canada (10.6 percent), and China (5.2 percent). The transaction was
divided into six-rated classes ranging from AA-rated paper to Ba2/BB-
rated paper, along with an un-rated equity piece worth $85 million. In
terms of yield opportunity, the AA-rated securities carried a return of
LIBOR+70 bps, the AA-rated securities offered LIBOR+150 bps, and
the Ba2/BB-rated paper had a stated return of 300 bps over LIBOR.
Insurance-linked Aircraft Receivables
In 1998, the first insurance-linked structure based on the residual value
of aircraft leases was completed. In this transaction, BAE (formerly British
Aerospace) purchased $3.8 billion worth of financial risk insurance to cover
two key aspects of the company’s risk exposure:
• Lease Portfolio Cover---the risk that the actual lease income on a
fixed portfolio of aircraft leases, adjusted for costs, is less than a
predetermined target level of income: and
• Aircraft Portfolio Cover---the risk that the residual value of repurchased
aircraft under the lease contracts is less than BAE’s contractual price
for aircraft repurchase.
The insurance protecting this exposure was then securitized through the
issuance of structured notes privately placed in the market through an SPV
similar to an ALPS structure. The structure used by BAE was later replicated
by both SAAB and Rolls Royce. The SAAB deal was a 15-year transaction
covering $1.3 billion worth of portfolio lease protection where investors
were given a stated return of LIBOR + 367 bps.
Stranded Cost Securitization
One area that is quickly becoming a main ABS product is the securitiz-
ation of the ‘‘stranded costs’’ of public utilities. Stranded costs refer to
power producer costs that were historically built into the traditional regu-
latory cost-plus system, but currently cannot be passed on to consumers due
to the competitive marketplace created by industry deregulation. Before
deregulation, power producers undertook significant investments in a
wide variety of capital expenditures designed to improve baseline produc-
tion. These expenditures included investments in high-cost nuclear and
fossil plants, deferred and capitalized operating costs, conservation and
economic development, nuclear decommissioning costs, and long-term
contractual obligations with high cost non-utility generators. Under the
traditional cost-plus regulatory system, these investments were encouraged
and passed on to consumers in the form of higher energy costs (Standard
& Poor’s 1998).
With the passage of the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (NEPA), the
United States began a national program of deregulation in the energy sector
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with the goal of creating a competitive marketplace in the production or
generation of power. The introduction of a competitive marketplace, along
with falling power generation costs, caused the wholesale price of power
to fall well below the traditional mark-up pricing rates used historically. As
a result, existing power plants had little ability to immediately recoup the
costs of their capital expenditure investments---leaving them saddled with
‘‘stranded costs’’ that threatened their profitability and even solvency. State
utility regulators passed legislation that enabled the utilities to set rates to
recover stranded costs (and any interest, servicing, or issuance costs of debt
used to finance stranded costs) from customers, but only when amortized
over a 30--40 year period. As a result, utilities looking to remain competitive
in the wholesale generation market turned to securitization to expedite the
recovery of these costs.
In a securitization of stranded assets, the utility company transfers both its
stranded cost liability and its interest in the state regulatory fees designed to
cover stranded costs (and associated financing charges) to a SPV. The SPV
then issues secured fixed-rate debt to investors, with the principal proceeds
being used to repay the utility company. In exchange for their investment,
investors receive an overcollateralized interest in the nonpassable, usage-
based, per kilowatt hour charges payable to the utility by residential and
commercial customers for the amortization of the stranded costs. As struc-
tured, the fees supporting the secured debt are designed to yield sufficient
revenue to amortize the notes funding the SPV after adjusting for any
servicing and issuance fees.
Of course, the actual retirement of the collateralized notes depends on
the actual usage and fee rates earned by the utility during the term of
the note. Lower usage rates than projected (e.g. warmer winters or cooler
summers) or lower overall revenue (e.g. adverse demographic changes)
could result in total collections falling below levels needed to support the
repayment of the structured debt. To mitigate this risk, the securitization
structure incorporates a ‘‘true-up’’ mechanism whereby the utility must go
to the state regulatory commission to secure an adjustment in the regulat-
ory tariffs charged to power consumers to cover any shortfall. As such, the
risk to investors associated with insufficient tariff revenue is minimized. At
the same time, if revenues exceed projections, the ‘‘true-up’’ mechanism
could lower tariffs for energy customers and mitigate the prepayment risk
of the debt. These structures also attempt to protect investors against spon-
sor insolvency---requiring that any company acquiring the sponsor assume
responsibility for meeting the terms of the securitization. Given the true-
up mechanism, the bankruptcy protection, and the collateralization of the
debt service payments, stranded cost securitizations consistently have been
rated AAA.
The securitization of stranded costs was initiated when the three big
Southern Californian Public Utility Companies (Southern California
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TABLE 13-6 Other Noteworthy Securitizations (Volume in $ US Millions)
Issuer Year $ Millions Risk
PGE,SCE, SDGE 1997 6,000.0 Stranded costs
Bowie Bonds 1997 55.0 Music royalties
FHLMC---MODERN’s 1998 243.0 Mortgages
Toyota---Gramercy Place 1998 566.0 Residual value
Toyotal Motor Company 1998 4,000.0 Auto residual value
British Aerospace 1998 3,770.0 Plane lease residual value
Gerling---SECTRS 1999 455.0 Credit
ResidenSea LTD 1999 260.0 Surety bond
Swiss Re---ELF 1999 330.0 Credit
Koch Energy---Kelvin 1999 50.0 Weather
PEAK 1999 106.0 Trade receivables
Criterion Healthcare 1999 100.0 Health care receivables
Swiss Re---ELF II 2000 330.0 Credit
SAAB 2000 1,300.0 Plane lease residual value
Triarc Companies 2000 290.0 Franchise royalty
Rolls Royce 2001 N/A Plane lease residual value
Total 17,855.0
Sources: Authors’ computations from Swiss Re (2001), Lane (2000, 2001).
Edison, Pacific Gas and Electric, and San Diego Gas and Electric) effect-
ively securitized $6 billion of their estimated $28 billion in stranded costs.
In this securitization, each utility issued multiple AAA-rated tranches of
secured debt with varying maturity dates and fixed rates of interest. Southern
California Edison, for example, issued seven classes of debt with maturities
ranging from 3 years to 12 years and fixed rates of interest ranging from
5.98 to 6.42 percent. Following this transaction, the securitization of utility
stranded costs quickly spread across the United States and now serves as
a key financing strategy for public utilities in a variety of states, including
Washington, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. The California
stranded cost securitization and some other noteworthy transactions are
summarized in Table 13-6.
Future Cash Flow Securitization
Other important ABS structures that have been successfully placed in the
market over the past several years include structured notes linked to firm
royalties, tobacco settlement payments, and tax lien receivables.
Royalty Bonds
Whether backed by revenue from future record sales (e.g. Bowie Bonds),
franchise profits (e.g. Triarc’s Arby’s Revenue), ticket sales (e.g. UK football
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clubs), or sports stadiums, a variety of ABS coming to the market are struc-
tured based on the valuation of future cash flows. In each of these cases,
the issuer is attempting to monetize a future flow of rental income through
the use of a securitization---effectively transferring the economic risk of cash
flow variability to the investor.
1. In the case of the ‘‘Bowie Bonds,’’ investors purchased the rights to the
future flow of David Bowie’s royalty payments from song and record
catalog copyrights for $55 million. In exchange, investors will receive
all royalty payments owed to David Bowie until the principal plus
8 percent interest is repaid (Benz, 2001). From the issuance of these
securities to June 2001, approximately $210 million in similar deals
were structured and issued into the market.
2. In the case of Triarc, Swiss Re was able to help the firm securitize
$290 million worth of future franchise royalties associated with Triarc’s
Arby’s fast-food restaurants through an SPV vehicle Triarc Franchise
Trust. In the transaction, which was settled in December of 2000, Triarc
issued 20-year non-recourse fixed rate notes at a rate of 7.44 percent.
The notes were credit enhanced by a first loss insurance policy issued
by Swiss Re and an excess-of-loss insurance policy provided by Ambac
Assurance Corporation. With the insurance, the notes carried a AAA-
rating from both Moody’s and S&P.19
Government Revenue Securitization
Starting in the early 1990s, state and local municipalities starting exploring
the securitization market as a means to monetize receivables associated with
outstanding tax collections (e.g. tax liens). Early success in this market has
since encouraged the spread of this public sector financing strategy to other
types of receivables, ranging from the tobacco settlements in the United
States to social security receivables in Italy.
Tax Lien Securitization---Starting in 1993, New York City started securitiz-
ing tax lien receivables in an effort to monetize the expected recovery value
of these tax receivables. Over the period 1996--2001, New York City success-
fully completed seven deals with an average annual volume of approximately
$138 million. Each deal also included several differently rated classes, typic-
ally ranging from a AAA-rated layer to a BBB-rated layer. For example, the
2001 transaction included four separate classes ranging from AAA-rated to
BBB-rated with fixed rates of interest ranging from 5.59 percent (AAA) to
6.29 percent (BBB). Given New York’s success, many other states and loc-
alities have followed suit. In fact, in 1997, several private companies were
established to facilitate multistate tax lien securitizations, opening up the
market for smaller states and localities.
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Tobacco Settlements ---With large liability awards granted to the states as part
of the US tobacco company settlements, states had a new annuity stream
of cash flow payments. Before long, states were again looking for an inex-
pensive financing mechanism for monetizing their interest in these tobacco
settlement payments. Recognizing their success in tax lien securitizations,
states quickly turned to the ABS market with tobacco settlement bonds-
-issuing over $4 billion in tobacco settlement payment ABS through the
end of 2001. These tobacco settlement bonds were securitized using a
variety of structures with ratings on senior tranches ranging from A1-Aa3
depending on the rating of the underlying tobacco firm and the level of
collateralization.
Evaluating Non-Traditional ABS and
Other New Securities
This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of holding non-
traditional ABS and other new assets. We also consider the important related
issue of how to evaluate the risk-adjusted return of these securities.
The Advantages and Disadvantages of ABS
Non-traditional ABS have two principal advantages for investors. First, by
securitizing cash flow streams that have not previously been traded in secur-
ities markets, ABS can create a non-redundant security that provides a
new source of diversification for investors---improving portfolio efficiency.
Second, particularly in the early stages of the market, non-traditional
ABS can offer superior risk-adjusted returns in comparison with compar-
ably rated conventional securities. As the market develops, however, one
would expect arbitrage trading to eliminate any abnormal returns from
holding these investments. Nevertheless, the diversification benefits of
these assets would persist even if arbitrage opportunities were not present.
Most ABS are also structured in such a way that investors can choose the
risk-return tranches that are most appealing in terms of their investment
strategies or can obtain access to opportunities not available in conventional
securities.
Non-traditional securities also have some potential disadvantages, which
can be expected to diminish in importance as the market continues to
develop. Because most ABS and non-traditional securities issued to date
have been privately placed, secondary market trading has been limited,
exposing investors to liquidity risk. In addition, because such securities are
often complex relative to conventional assets, they are more difficult to
evaluate, raising transactions costs and exposing investors to an additional
source of uncertainty.
Another key risk that investors have to evaluate with non-traditional ABS
is the potential for moral hazard, adverse selection, and other forms of
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risk-shifting within the transaction. In addition to the potential for risk shift-
ing in the underlying assets (e.g. making loans to customers in a credit
transaction), the potential exists for the actual structure to induce risk
shifting by the issuer. For example, a bank that securitizes its credit risk
exposure to a specific sector through a structured note in order to obtain
additional lending capacity may then expand lending activities within this
same sector---increasing the overall debt burden and riskiness of that sec-
tor. Moreover, if the bank can ‘‘substitute’’ assets into a structured pool,
the bank may have the incentive to substitute ‘‘bad loans’’ into the secur-
itized pools and keep the higher-performing loans on the bank’s balance
sheet. The same process can occur in the area of property insurance, where
the structured note payouts are closely linked to the insurance company’s
insured properties (i.e. the insurer may place higher risk properties into the
pool). As a result, investors must be careful to evaluate, control, and price
for moral hazard opportunities in each ABS structure.
The limited experience so far in trading some types of cash flow steams
incorporated in ABS also suggests that such securities may be subject to
risks that are presently unforeseen by issuers and investors. Non-traditional
swaps and options, which are not asset-backed, are subject to all of these
potential disadvantages as well as the additional regulatory and market risks
of undertaking off-balance sheet exposures. Finally, because of the types of
cash flows covered by some of these securities and the fact that they usually
contain embedded options, conventional valuation methods are not likely
to be adequate to evaluate the risk-return trade-offs provided by many of
these securities. The next section proposes a valuation methodology that
may overcome this last limitation.
Evaluating the Risk-Adjusted Returns of Non-traditional ABS
With an understanding of the dynamics underlying non-traditional ABS
and other new products, we now turn to the issue of how pension fund
managers should value these securities. As discussed above, the first objective
in evaluating any security with an embedded option is to ensure that the
security’s return at least compensates the investor for the expected value of
the loss being transferred. While few would argue with this presupposition,
prospective investors often find the process of evaluating the expected loss
transferred under these transactions challenging.
Measuring the Expected Loss Transfer
The rating agencies have tried to bring some clarity to the process of meas-
uring expected losses on non-traditional ABS in their assignment of ratings.
Specifically, the rating agencies generally apply the same ‘‘probability of
“chap13” — 2003/6/4 — page 299 — #32
13 / Securitized Risk Instruments 299
default’’ methodology to structured transactions as applied to credit trans-
actions. As an example, we consider the corporate bond default rates from
1990 to 2001, shown in Table 13-7. Since a BB-rated corporate credit is expec-
ted to have an average annual default rate of approximately 1.2 percent,
a Ba-rated ABS should be expected to have an average probability of
loss of 1.2 percent. Moreover, since most of the options embedded in
non-traditional ABS represent low frequency/high severity risks, market
participants often assume a 100 percent severity and use this approach to
examine the expected loss of each transaction. As such, a ratings-based
approach, while not a substitute for a full analysis of the underlying risk,
provides a good first approximation in evaluating the return structure of an
ABS deal.
Although bond ratings provide guidance when evaluating non-traditional
ABS, they need to be supplemented by other sources of information
that allow the investor to understand the financial, economic, and phys-
ical processes underlying the potential losses on each contract. For
example, if we look at the estimated annual expected losses of five
BB-rated CatBonds issued during 1999, the estimated annual expected loss
on each transaction ranged from 0.30 to 0.75 percent, with three of the
deals estimated pegged to the 0.42--0.45 percent range (Lane, 2000). Thus,
the pricing of these securities imply that either the probability of an event
or the expected loss given an event occurs is less than for comparably rated
securities with different underlying risks. A straight application of a ratings-
based approach would have overestimated the actual amount of loss transfer
in these securities, understating the true expected return on the bonds.
Within a given asset-class, ratings provide a more uniform standard.
Nonetheless, investors need to understand the underlying risk dynamic
of each risk. Investors in CatBonds need to understand the dynamic pro-
cesses underlying catastrophe risk; investors in weather-linked securities
need to understand the physical processes associated with degree-days;
and investors in credit-linked notes need to be comfortable with eval-
uating the financial and economic conditions that influence defaults.
As such, investing in non-traditional ABS involves a significant investment
in education and risk measurement tools by the investor---an investment
that often forces investors to concentrate their expertise into just a few
non-traditional markets.
Fortunately, since the early 1990s, significant advances have been
made in the modeling of non-traditional risks. During this period, con-
siderable research has been devoted to the development of pricing
models for catastrophe risk (e.g. Dong, Shah, and Wong, 1996; Cummins,
Lewis, and Phillips, 1998; Aase, 2001), weather risks and power risks
(e.g. Lucia and Schwartz, 2002), and mortality-linked securities
(e.g. Blake and Burrows, 2001). Moreover, firms such as Applied Insurance
Research, Risk Management Solutions, and EQECAT have entered the
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market with simulation models to evaluate the risks being transferred within
securities backed by a variety of natural phenomena. Historical weather data
are available to help develop prices for weather-linked securities. However,
the fact that non-traditional methodologies and databases must be used
in evaluating these securities and the absence of traded market prices for
these securities increases the costs of valuing their risk-return trade-offs and
imposes a steeper learning curve on investors in comparison with securities
based on more familiar cash flows.
The learning curve is less steep for institutional investors entering the
credit-linked ABS market. Significant progress has been made in evaluat-
ing credit risk and pricing credit-linked securities. The credit risk pricing
methodologies are available to address wide variety of asset-types and
pricing requirements. For traded assets, these credit risk tools include
simple rating migration models, term structure models of credit-spread risk,
reduced form term structure models of default risk, and structural models
of default risk. Furthermore, these models are readily available from com-
mercial vendors such as CreditMetrics, Kamikura Corp., and KMV Inc. For
non-traded assets, statistical hazard rate models, discriminant analysis, and
neural network techniques have been applied to evaluate the credit risk
profile of a portfolio of assets classes. Thus, while no one credit risk pricing
model has been accepted as the dominant methodology, sufficient techno-
logy exists today for pricing a wide variety of credit-risk sensitive products.
For the interested reader, Kao (2000) provides a brief overview of these
different credit risk methodologies.
Estimating Risk-Adjusted Returns
Once the pension fund manager understands the portion of the return
in excess of the risk-free rate going to compensate for the expected loss
transferred, he can analyze the risk-adjusted return for underwriting this
type of risk. To analyze the risk-return trade-offs of alternative investment
strategies, most pension fund managers look to the traditional one-factor
CAPM to assess the risk-adjusted return required for investing in any par-
ticular asset class. Based on the assumption that either all asset returns are
normally distributed or that investors have mean--variance preferences, the
CAPM model shows that, in equilibrium, all assets will yield the same equi-
librium risk-adjusted rate of return. As a result, the expected return on any
asset or portfolio can be computed as a simple combination of the risk-free
rate of interest and a market risk premium based on the asset’s estimated
beta:
E (ra) = rf + βa [E (rm)− rf ] (13.1)
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where ra = the return on a given security or portfolio; rf = the risk-free rate
of interest; rm = the return on the market portfolio; and
βa = Cov(ra , rm)Var (rm) (13.2)
The significance of the traditional CAPM model in the pension investment
world is highlighted by the fact that fund manager performance is regularly
evaluated based on the ability to consistently outperform specific market
benchmarks. ‘‘Outperform’’ is usually measured directly in terms of the
fund manager’s ability to generate α-return, defined by.
αa = E (ra |)− βa [E (rm)− rf ] − rf (13.3)
In Equation (13.3), E (ra |) represents the expected return on a given
asset/portfolio based on the information set used by the investment man-
ager (). Hence, in equilibrium, the α-performance of any investment fund
manager should be zero unless the manager has superior information on
investments. Alternatively, positive indicates that a given pension investment
fund manager is adding value in comparison to passively-managed index
investment strategies.
The assumptions underlying the traditional CAPM model, however, gen-
erally do not hold with respect to assets like ABS, whose return distributions
are often highly skewed. First, the return distribution of ABS are usu-
ally a function of a collateral pool and a short call option that allows the
issuer to transfer losses to the holder of the ABS under certain low fre-
quency/high severity events. Portfolios with embedded options of this type
generally are not normally distributed. Secondly, as highlighted by Kraus
and Litzenberger (1976), investors value positive skewness in evaluating
alternative investment strategies. As such, assuming that investor prefer-
ences are completely defined using a simple mean--variance framework will
lead to asset mispricing for assets with non-symmetric return distributions.
Leland (1999) highlights the importance of this asset mispricing and
demonstrates that any mispricing ultimately manifests in biased estimates
of the investment fund manager’s α-return. Thus, measuring a fund invest-
ment manager’s performance under a traditional CAPM model will lead
to biased estimates of excess returns. More importantly, the traditional
CAPM measure could provide incentives for the investment manager to
purchase too much or too little non-traditional ABS for the pension portfo-
lio, moving the fund return away from the efficient security market return
line. Fortunately, Leland (1999) also demonstrates how a correction to the
traditional CAPM model can provide unbiased estimates of investment fund
performance without the need to develop more sophisticated valuation
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TABLE 13-8 Estimated Excess Returns Representative ABS (1999)
Issuer/Asset Class Term
(Years)
Security
Rating
Volume
($ US Millions)
Estimated
Excess Return
CatBonds
Domestic Re (Kemper) 3 BB+ 80 3.24
Concentric Re (Oriental) 5 BB+ 100 2.72
Residential Re 1 BB 200 3.27
Golden Eagle CatBond 2 BBB− 50 2.28
Credit Risk
Gerling SECTRS---C 3 BBB 82 1.00
Weather Risk
Kelvin 2nd Event 3 BBB− 23 4.52
Source : Lane (2001).
Note : Excess return represents spread over risk-free rate and premium for expected loss.
models. Specifically, he shows that the discrete time asset-pricing model
developed by Rubinstein (1976) can be used to adjust the traditional CAPM
model to account for investor preferences for higher moments of the return
distribution. The key assumptions for making this adjustment are that the
return on the market portfolio is independent and identically distributed at
any moment in time and that the market is complete in the sense that the
law of one price holds and all relevant risks are traded in the market. Both
assumptions are consistent with assumptions used in conducting empirical
research on market returns and the notion that a representative investor
values higher moments of any given return distribution (e.g. skewness and
kurtosis).20
Following Leland, we can evaluate the risk-adjusted returns of altern-
ative asset classes like non-traditional ABS by evaluating the return
dynamics of the underlying asset portfolio and adjusting for a modified
measure of the market price of risk. Using this approach provides a better cri-
terion for evaluating the attractiveness of these assets within a portfolio for a
pension fund. It also provides a better measurement framework for assessing
the performance of fund managers relative to benchmark returns.21
Table 13-8 provides a useful illustration of the value of this approach.
Here we examine six different ABS deals that include three traditional
catastrophe bonds, the catastrophe bond issued for the Oriental Land com-
pany, Gerling’s European credit risk structure, and the Kelvin Weather
derivatives structure. With the exception of the USAA transaction, all of
these deals were multi-period, carried ratings between BB+ and BBB, and
had a notional value in the range of $23--$100 million. Moreover, using
information from Lane (2001), we computed the excess return over the
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estimated expected loss associated with each transaction. What is striking
about this comparison is that the excess returns built into the CatBonds and
weather derivatives are 250--450 bps in excess of the expected loss, whereas
our pricing approach would suggest that these zero-b securities should be
priced at or near the expected loss being transferred. At the same time, the
excess return offered on the Gerling transaction---a transaction with signi-
ficant systemic risk (positive b)---is relatively thin as compared with other
ABS structures. This result, which is consistent with other studies, illustrates
the value in correctly pricing these securities and the potential benefits of
including a portion of these securities in a pension fund’s asset allocation
strategy.
Conclusion
Financial innovation has led to the creation of several new classes of secur-
ities that provide opportunities for institutional investors to improve the
efficiency of their portfolios. Our objective here has been to provide inform-
ation on the design and valuation of some of the more promising and
innovative securities that have been introduced. We focus primarily on non-
traditional ABS and also discuss several innovative derivative securities on
non-traditional underlying assets and cash flows.
Securitization of non-traditional cash flows and risks has been driven
by both demand and supply factors. Demand for new securities arises
when new risks appear and when existing risks become more significant
in magnitude. Risk expansion helps to explain the development of mort-
gage backed securities during the 1970s and 1980s, catastrophic risk bonds
and option in the 1990s, and many other financial innovations. Supply
factors driving the market include the development of modern financial
models, which enable investors to price and value the new securities,
as well as technological and communications advances that give more
flexibility and modeling power to financial engineers. These factors have
combined to permit the securitization of cash flows that were previously
held on-balance sheet by financial intermediaries and industrial firms as
well as the securitization of cash flows that were not previously considered
viable candidates for financing or trading.
The development of non-traditional ABS and derivatives on non-
traditional underlyings provides significant opportunities for pension fund
investment managers. These securities provide a new source of diversific-
ation, often have attractive yields in comparison with comparably rated
conventional securities, and enable managers to take positions in risk-return
tranches that are consistent with their investment objectives to a greater
extent than in the past.
Some caution is in order in approaching this market because some
of the securities are complex and may be subject to unforeseeable risks.
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In addition, at the present time, many of these new derivatives are relatively
illiquid. Most of these non-traditional ABS and the new derivative contracts
also are characterized by highly skewed returns such that the traditional
CAPM benchmarking techniques are likely to give misleading results.
Fortunately, relatively straightforward models have been developed that
generalize the CAPM to give meaningful risk-adjusted return valuations for
the new financial instruments. Investment managers who make the com-
mitment to learn how to evaluate and price these contracts will be well
positioned to take advantage of this important market as it continues to
evolve and expand. Investment managers can expect to have access to a
growing volume of privately placed contracts as well as more standardized
and liquid publicly traded contracts on non-traditional cash flows.
Notes
1The volume of financial transactions also has increased significantly, reflecting eco-
nomic growth as well as the process of moving many assets and liabilities off-balance
sheet. For example, the value of international debt instruments outstanding quad-
rupled during the 1990s to nearly $7.5 trillion, and the notional value of outstanding
derivatives (open interest) rose from less than $1 trillion in 1986 to nearly $25 trillion
at the end of 2001 (Bank for International Settlements).
2The collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and Barings Bank in 1995
provide object lessons in types of disasters that can occur when various types of risks
are not foreseen or appreciated.
3The Bond Market Association, <www.bondmarkets.com/research/mbsdat2.
shtml>.
4Data based on ‘‘Summary of Worldwide Securitization in 2001,’’ Asset-Backed Alert,
<http://www.abalert.com>.
5Only about 60 percent of all ABS are publicly traded securities and the bulk of these
are residential (RMBS) or commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).
6Readers should be cautioned that, while we have taken extreme caution in ensuring
quality of the information reported in this chapter, the information is limited in
breadth and depth to what was obtainable from reliable sources. Actual deal lists
and transaction detail may differ from the information reported herein.
7These figures are based on the definition of a catastrophe devised by Swiss Re, which
defines losses as catastrophic if they exceed specified dollar valued thresholds that
vary by type of catastrophe. For insured property catastrophes other than marine
and aviation, Swiss Re defines a catastrophe for 2001 as an event causing at least
$35.1 million in insured property loss (Swiss Re, 2002).
8In fact, the perception among insurers that CAT index securities are subject to
unacceptable levels of basis risk has been identified as the primary obstacle to the
more rapid development of the CAT-loss securities market. For an analysis of the
basis risk of index-linked CAT-loss derivatives, see Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips
(2002b).
9Nine indices were available---a national index, five regional indices, and three state
indices (for California, Florida, and Texas). The indices were based on PCS estimates
of catastrophic property losses in the specified geographical areas during quarterly
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or annual exposure periods. The indices were defined as the total accumulated
losses divided by $100 million. For example, a 20/40 Eastern call spread would be in
the money for a catastrophic loss accumulation in the Eastern region of more than
$2 billion (20 points). Each index point was worth $200 on settlement so that one
20/40 call would pay a maximum of $4,000 (20 points times $200 per point).
10Over-the-counter options also have been traded, although these usually settle on
insurer-specific loss criteria (Swiss Re, 2001).
11To better target investor appetites, USAA’s notes were actually divided into an
A-1 Class of $164 million that was principal protected, rated AAA, and priced at
LIBOR + 273 bps; and an A-2 Class of $313 million that had both principal and
interest at risk, was rated BB/BB-, and priced at LIBOR + 575 bps.
12USAA actually purchased private reinsurance to cover a large portion of these
‘‘retained’’ exposures.
13Surplus notes are a quasi-debt security issued by insurers in the United States that
are treated as equity capital for regulatory purposes, provided that they satisfy the
appropriate regulatory criteria.
14In addition to these deals, American Skandia has entered into a series of trans-
actions (e.g. ASLAC Trust I and II) designed to securitize their interest in money
management fees from managed mutual fund portfolios. While American Skandia
is entitled to earn these fund management fees at the inception of an account, the
recognition of the fee income must be accrued over the life of the fund. To exped-
ite the recognition of these fees, Skandia has effectively sold its interest in this fee
income.
15See for example, Capital Markets Report, Dow Jones & Company, May 1998.
16See, for example, BondWeek, November 19, 2001.
17Technically, the ownership of the aircraft assets are transferred to the SPV trust to
secure the interest of investors. The trust then enters into a lease agreement with
the airline for the use of the aircraft assets and provides the airline sponsor with an
equity interest sized by the initial deposit for the aircraft being purchased.
18For more information on Aircraft Securitizations, see S&P rating criteria for
aircraft securities.
19‘‘Arby’s Completes Innovative Securitization of Franchise Royalty Payments,’’
TRIARC Press Release, November 22, 2000.
20Under these assumptions, Leland shows that the expected return formula can be
re-specified as follows:
E (ra ) = rf + β ′a [E (rm )− rf ] (13.4)
where
β ′a =
Cov[ra ,−(1 + rm )−b ]
Cov[rm ,−(1 + rm )−b ] (13.5)
The parameter b is the market’s price of risk when the return on the market
portfolio is lognormally distributed (as implied by the first model assumption), and
can be determined from observable market factors:
b = in[E (1 + rm )] − in(1 + rf )
Var [in(1 + rm )] (13.6)
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where in[•] refers to instantaneous parameter estimates. Thus, the coefficient b is the
market’s instantaneous excess rate of return divided by the variance of the market’s
instantaneous rate of return. Parallel to the traditional CAPM model, Leland shows
how to derive an adjusted α-estimate that differs only in the specification for the
market’s price of risk.
α′a = E (ra |)− β ′a [E (rm )− rf ] − rf (13.7)
21This approach also is superior to the comparison of Sharpe ratios since Sharpe
ratios---like the traditional CAPM model---are only relevant when investors have
mean--variance preferences.
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